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COMMENTARY

Lender Liability for Securities
Law Violations of Its Borrowers
With increasing frequency, financial institutions that have extended credit
to borrowers engaged in the sale of securities have become favorite liability
targets for malcontented investors seeking to recoup losses occasioned by
the borrowers' violations of the securities acts of 1933 and 1934.1 This com-

mentary discusses whether a lender who is implicated with a borrower by
virtue of a legitimate financial transaction should be held liable for the
federal securities law violations of that borrower.
Lender counsel justifiably fear that the investor protection policy that

promoted federal securities legislation is becoming mutated into an insurance
policy. Judicial construction and application of the securities laws to sec-

ondary defendents is confused, nonuniform, and unpredictable. Presently,
it is virtually impossible for counsel to advise financial institutions whether
the legitimate business relationship between the lender and its borrower is
cause to expose the lender to liability for the borrower's violations of the

securities acts. 2

The introductory sections of this comment summarize the statutory au-

thority and case law interpretations upon which plaintiffs suing financial
institutions tend to rely. "Seller" status under section 12(2) of the Securities

Act of 19331 (1933 Act) and "controlling person" liability, provided in section

154

of the 1933 Act and section 20(a)5 of the Securities Exchange Act

of 1934 (1934 Act), are the first two topics discussed. The succeeding por-

1. See Jones, Berry Drilling ProgramInvestors File $9 Million FederalLawsuit, The Daily
Oklahoman, Nov. 1, 1983. ("Alleging fraud and violations of state and federal securities laws,
37 disgruntled oil and gas investors lodged a $9 million federal lawsuit Monday against 27
defendants including Utica National Bank & Trust Co. of Tulsa...

.").

See also Wright v.

Schock, 571 F. Supp. 642 (N.D. Cal. 1983), aff'd, 742 F.2d 541 (9th Cir. 1984); In re Longhorn
Sec. Litig., 573 F. Supp. 274 (W.D. Okla. 1983); Wurzburg v. Cornelius, Nos. 83 Civ. 0628
(PNL), 83 Civ. 0794 (PNL); 83-0589 (JRx) (S.D.N.Y., July 19, 1982); In re Longhorn Sec.
Litig., No. 525, slip op. (J.P.M.D.L., Dec. 23, 1982).
2. See Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931). Chief Justice
Cardozo remarked: "The hazards of a business conducted on these terms are so extreme as
to enkindle doubt whether a flaw may not exist in the implication of a duty that exposes to
these consequences." Id. at 179-80, 174 N.E. at 444.
3. 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1982) (section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933). See also Silverstein,
Seller Liability under Section 12(2) of the SecuritiesAct of 1933: A ProximateCause-Substantial
Factor Approach Limited by a Duty of Inquiry, 36 VAND. L. REv. 361 (1983).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 770 (1982) (section 15 of the Securities Act of 1933).
5. 15 U.S.C. § 78T(a) (1982) (section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
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tions review section 17(a), 6 section 10(b), 7 and rule 10b-58 prohibitions against

fraud, misrepresentation, deceptive practices, and duty to disclose. The remaining introductory materials discuss the common law doctrines of aider
and abettor and respondeat superior as asserted by plaintiffs independently
and intermixed with the foregoing statutory provisions.

Following the introductory sections, this commentary provides discussion
and examples of cases where lenders have been joined as defendants by
reason of their business relationship with the borrower-securities law violator. Thereafter substantial attention will be devoted to the recent case of
Wright v. Schock.9 Wright is important not only because summary judgment
was entered for the defendant banks but also for the manner and certainty
with which the court came to its decision. The remainder of this commentary
combines criticism of the theoretical justification for holding lenders liable
for the securities law violations of their borrowers and notes the adverse
practical impact of such proposed liability.
I.

"Seller" Liability Under Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933

The primary goal of the 1933 Act was to assure full disclosure of all

material facts relevant to the issuance of new securities, thereby justifying
reliance on that information by investors and restoring public confidence in
the investment market. 10 This substantial obligation placed on the seller of
a security is reflected in the statutory provisions of the 1933 Act.
6. 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1982).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
8. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1984).
9. 571 F. Supp. 642 (N.D. Cal. 1983), aff'd, 742 F.2d 541 (9th Cir. 1984).
10. S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933). Mr. Fletcher from the Committee on
Banking and Currency offered:
The purpose of this bill is to protect the investing public and honest business.
The basic policy is that of informing the investor of the facts concerning securities
to be offered for sale in interstate commerce, and providing protection against
fraud and misrepresentation.
The aim is to prevent further exploitation of the public by the sale of unsound,
fraudulent, and worthless securities through misrepresentation; to place adequate
and true information before the investor; to protect honest enterprise, seeking
capital by honest presentation, against the competition afforded by dishonest securities offered to the public through crooked promotion. ...
See also, H.R. REP. No. 4314, 73d Cong., IstSess. § 6 (1933):
There is, however, an obligation upon us to insist that every issue of new securities
to be sold in interstate commerce shall be accompanied by full publicity and
information, and that no essentially important element attending the issue shall
be concealed from the buying public.
This proposal adds to the ancient rule of caveat emptor, the further doctrine
"let the seller also beware." It puts the burden of telling the whole truth on the
seller.
It should give impetus to honest dealing in securities and thereby bring
back public confidence.
The purpose of the legislation I suggest is to protect the public with the least
possible interference to honest business.
Franklin D. Roosevelt (emphasis added).
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Section 12(2) protects the purchaser of a security from persons who offer

or sell securities by means of untrue statements or omissions of material
facts. The plain import of the language in the statute indicates that the
remedy is intended to reach the person from whom the defrauded purchaser

bought his securities. Unless the seller can prove that he did not know and
in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known of such untruth

or omission, that seller will be primarily liable to the purchaser for the
consideration paid for the security, with interest, less the amount of any

income received, or for damages if he no longer owns the security.
Lenders dealing with their customers in the traditional manner, that of
a pure lender-borrower relationship, should not fall within the definition of
a seller, absent certain qualifying circumstances as discussed below. Financial
institutions, however, may not be completely shielded from seller status if
the lender's relationship with its borrower proves to be a proximate cause

or a substantial factor in the illegal distribution of securities."
As a prerequisite to recovery under section 12(2), strict privity between

the seller and the purchaser has been held a staunch requirement in some

courts.' 2 Both a broker and a seller can be held liable under section 12(2)

where the broker acts as an agent for the seller. Further, the plaintiff need
not identify in his complaint the particular seller from whom he purchased
his securities where the principal has concealed his identity.' 3 Similarly, the
specification of particular defendants from whom each plaintiff purchased
securities may not be required when the complaint alleges a conspiracy among
persons in control of the direct seller who allegedly violated the securities
law.' 4 Nevertheless, at times, strict privity between the buyer and the immediate seller has been required despite allegations in the complaint that
5
there was a conspiracy among the defendants.'
6
In McFarland v. Memorex Corporation' the plaintiff alleged causes of

11. Silverstein, supra note 3, at 370: "Rejecting the strict privity, participation and duty
approaches, many courts employ a proximate causation test to delineate the scope of Section
12(2) seller liability." Wonneman v. Stratford Sec. Co., [1961-1964 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 90,923 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) was one of the first cases to apply this test. See,
e.g., Junker v. Cory, 650 F.2d 1349 (5th Cir. 1981); Croy v. Campbell, 624 F.2d 709 (5th
Cir. 1980); Pharo v. Smith, 621 F.2d 656 (5th Cir. 1980); Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l
Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1971); Lennerth v. Mendenhall, 234 F. Supp. 59 (N.D.
Ohio, 1964).
12. Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 619 F.2d 1222, 1226 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 1005 (1981); Collins v. Signetics Corp., 605 F.2d 110, 113 (3d Cir. 1979); Cady v. Murphy,
113 F.2d 988 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 705 (1940) (only seller as title holder or brokeragent of seller can be in privity with the purchaser); Kramer v. Scientific Control Corp., 452
F. Supp. 812 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Brick v. Dominion Mort. & Realty Trust, 442 F. Supp. 283
(W.D.N.Y. 1977); Dorfman v. First Boston Corp., 336 F. Supp. 1089 (E.D. Pa. 1972). But
see McFarland v. Memorex Corp. [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. RaP. 99,635
(N.D. Cal. 1984).
13. Buckholtz v. Renard, 188 F. Supp. 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
14. Bailey v. Huntington Sec. Co., 35 F.R.D. 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
15. Kramer v. Scientific Control Corp., 452 F. Supp. 812 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
16. 493 F. Supp. 631 (N.D. Cal. 1980).
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action based on section 12(2), among others, in connection with a transaction
involving the offer and sale of shares of common stock of Memorex Corporation. The plaintiff's complaint stated that each defendant was sued both
individually, as a coconspirator, and as an aider and abettor. Also, with
respect to certain defendants, the complaint contained allegations of a control relationship.
The court in McFarland granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the
plaintiff's section 12(2) claim because the plaintiff failed to allege that he
purchased his stock from any of the moving defendants. The court adopted
a literal interpretation of section 12(2), rejected an expansive view of the
statutory term "seller," and stated:
[The Court recognize[s] that a literal reading has not been adopted
by all courts. Even under a broader standard, however, a mere
allegation of co-conspiracy or of aiding and abetting will not suffice. Congressional intent is paramount in interpreting the reach
of the statute. If it appears that Congress intended to place certain
limits on liability, as here where it made only sellers liable, then
by resort to theories of conspiracy
those limits cannot be ignored
17
or aiding and abetting.
As indicated in McFarland, however, not all courts regard strict privity as
an absolute prerequisite to liability under section 12(2).8
A participation theory 9 and/or a duty20 approach have been offered as
means to avoid the strict privity requirement. Numerically, however, the
"proximate cause-substantial factor" line of cases dominates seller status
analysis. Plaintiffs are more likely to be successful using these theories than
when the
the strict privity approach for extension of liability to lenders
2
lender's customers are the contractual sellers of the securities. '
The substantial factor approach was espoused in Hill York Corp. v. American InternationalFranchises,Inc.22 According to Hill York, a determination
17. Id. at 647, citing In re Equity Funding Corp. of Am. Sec. Litig., 416 F. Supp. 161,
181 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
18. The Court in McFarlandrecently granted a motion to reconsider the plaintiffs' section
12(2) claims because the definition of seller has been judicially broadened to include persons
whose participation in the securities transaction directly and proximately caused an investor's
injury. 581 F. Supp. 878 (N.D. Cal. 1984). See also Silverstein, supra note 3, at 367.
19. In re Home-Stake Prod. Co. Sec. Litig., 76 F.R.D. 337 (N.D. Okla. 1975); Freed v
Szabo Food Serv., Inc., [1961-1964 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. RaP. (CCH) 91,317 (N.D.
Ill. 1964).
20. Gould v. Tricon, Inc., 272 F. Supp. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
21. Silverstein, supra note 3, at 368-69.
22. 448 F.2d 680, 692 (5th Cir. 1971). See also Stokes v. Lokken, 644 F.2d 779 (8th Cir.
1981); Croy v. Campbell, 624 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1980) (a tax adviser who made no representations concerning any of the operational or construction aspects of the project in which his
clients invested, delivered a brochure to the clients on behalf of the clients but not on behalf
of the general partner of the project, did not attempt to persuade the clients that they should
purchase an interest in the project, and referred to the project as the best investment they
could make from a tax standpoint, was not a seller of a security).
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that one participated in the sales transaction is not conclusive as to that
3
participant's liability as a seller. The Fifth Circuit stated in Pharo v. Smith
24
that Hill York and Lewis v. Walston & Co. limit the definition of sellers
under section 12(2) to (1) those in privity with the purchaser and (2) those
whose participation in the transaction is a substantial factor in causing the
transaction to take place. "Mere participation in the events leading up to
the transaction is not enough.'' 25
A lender's participation in the promotion and sale of its customer's securities to the extent necessary to fall within the holdings above is conceivable. However, the emphasis should be placed on the fact that "[t]he
test is whether the injury to the plaintiff flowed directly from the defendant."

26

Courts understandably seem reluctant to expand the scope of seller status.
"A review of the substantial factor cases shows that a much greater degree
of involvement is necessary to establish section 12 liability than simply the
provision of routine though necessary services .
.*"27 Moreover, courts
have found section 12 inapplicable to persons much more directly involved
in transactions than banks and title companies. 28 Although the United States
Supreme Court has yet to speak on the scope of seller status under section
12(2), the trend is to return to a strict privity approach.2 9 Presently, more
than mere participation but less than strict privity seems to be the balance
of the law.3 0
23. 621 F.2d 656 (5th Cir.), reh'g granted, remanded, 625 F.2d 1226 (1980).
24. 487 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1977).
25. Pharo v. Smith, 621 F.2d 656, 667 (5th Cir.), reh'g granted, remanded, 625 F.2d 1226
(1980) (emphasis added).
26. Admiralty Fund v. Jones, 677 F.2d 1289 (9th Cir. 1982). The court also dropped a
footnote following its remark:
Note that the broad reading of 'seller' may be in some doubt in light of recent
Supreme Court cases that prescribe a strict statutory construction approach to
the securities acts and reject their expansion with tort and criminal theories. See
Admiralty Fund v. Hugh Johnson & Co., 677 F.2d 1301, 1311 n.12 (9th Cir.
1982).
27. Wright v. Schock, 571 F. Supp. 642, 657 (N.D. Cal. 1983), aff'd, 742 F.2d 541 (9th
Cir. 1984), citing Admiralty Fund v. Jones, 677 F.2d 1289 (9th Cir. 1982); SEC v. Murphy,
626 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1980); Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d
680 (5th Cir. 1972). See also Montgomery v. Batt, [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 99,647 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
28. Wright v. Schock, 571 F. Supp. 642, 657 (N.D. Cal. 1983), aff'd, 742 F.2d 541 (9th
Cir. 1984).
29. Silverstein, supra note 3, at 381.
30. Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1971); Katz
v. Amos Treat & Co., 411 F.2d 1046 (2d Cir. 1969); Woods v. Homes & Structures, Inc., 489
F. Supp. 1270 (D. Kan. 1980), citing Lewis v. Walston & Co., 487 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1973);
Plunkett v. Francisco, 430 F. Supp. 235 (N.D. Ga. 1977); Stern v. American Bankshares Corp.,
429 F. Supp. 818 (E.D. Wis. 1977); Hoglund v. Covington County Bank, [1977-1978 Transfer
Binder] FED. Sac. L. RP. (CCH) 96,003 (M.D. Ala. 1977); In re Home-Stake Prod. Co.
Sec. Litig., 76 F.R.D. 337 (N.D. Okla. 1975); In re Caesar's Palace Sec. Litig., 360 F. Supp.
366 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); duPont v. Wyly, 61 F.R.D. 615 (D.Del. 1973); Brick v. Dominion Mort.
& Realty Trust, 442 F. Supp. 283 (W.D.N.Y. 1977). See also supra note 16, and accompanying
text.
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Rarely do plaintiffs solely allege violations of section 12(2); most often
the complaints also assert violations of section 17(a) of the 1933 Act -, and
both section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and rule lOb-5. 3 2 Although lenders may
not be found primarily liable under these provisions, it is arguable that the
controlling person provisions of the securities acts can subject lenders to
secondary liability for securities violations.
II.

"Controlling Person" Liability

Section 15 and Section 20(a)
Section 15 of the 1933 Act creates joint and several liability for every
person who controls anyone liable under certain enumerated sections."a Ostensibly, a lender may face exposure to secondary liability under section 15
if its customer has made false registration statements, 34 or has provided either
untrue or misstated information in prospectuses or oral communication, or
has omitted material facts therefrom. 5 The sole defense to section 15 secondary liability is proof that the controlling person had no knowledge or
reasonable grounds to believe in the existence of facts by which the liability
of the controlled person is alleged to exist.
A plaintiff alleging section 15 secondary liability for a lender must prove
a primary violation of at least one of the enumerated securities act sections
and that the lender controlled its borrower to the extent required to bring
the lender within the terms of the section. Thereafter, the burden shifts to
the lender to establish what is, in essence, a defense of ignorance. The controlling person section of the 1934 Act resembles section 15 of the 1933 Act
but adds a provision for indirect control and alters the defense somewhat. 36
Good faith and freedom from having induced, directly or indirectly, the acts
constituting the securities violation will protect the controlling person.
What constitutes control for purposes of section 15 and section 20(a) is
discussed in the following section. The conflict between the commercial necessity that a lender acquire sufficient knowledge about the business practices
of its borrower to justify extending credit to that borrower and the resulting
difficulty in establishing a section 15 defense is discussed in part VII.
Determining Control
Neither section 15 nor section 20 define the term "control." This omission
was deliberate on the part of the drafters and was left to judicial interpretation.3 7 However, the Securities Exchange Commission has supplemented
31. 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1982).

32. 15 U.S.C. § 78j, (b) (1982) and 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1984), respectively.
33. 15 U.S.C. § 770 (1982).

34. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1982).
35. 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1982).
36. 15 U.S.C. § 78t (1982).
37. H.R. RP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1934):
It was thought undesirable to attempt to define the term [control]. It would be
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the statutory language with its own definition: "The term 'control' (including

the terms 'controlling,' 'controlled by' 'and under common control with' )
means the possession, direct or indirect, of the power to direct or cause the
direction of the management and policies of a person, whether through the
ownership of voting securities, by contract or otherwise." 3

At least two

phrases have been used by courts to distinguish types of control: control by
status and actual control.
Control by status concerns one's formal position of control over the actions of the primary violator. Hierarchical structures of authority are the
most common examples. By this theory, superiors in authority may have to
answer for the securities violations of their inferiors. Interlocking directorships, stock ownership, alone or combined with other influences, or agency

relationship may or may not suffice to meet the formal control-by-status
standard.3 9
difficult if not impossible to enumerate or to anticipate the many ways in which
actual control may be exerted. A few examples of the methods used are stock
ownership, lease, contract, and agency. It is well known that actual control sometimes may be exerted through ownership of much less than a majority of the
stock of a corporation either by the ownership of such stock alone or through
such ownership in combination with other factors.
38. 17 C.F.R. § 230.405(0 (1984). See also Bartlett & Lapatin, The Status of a Creditor
as a "Controlling Person," 28 MERCER L. REv. 639 (1977).
39. See, e.g. Richardson v. MacArthur, 451 F.2d 35 (10th Cir. 1971) (where a paid corporate
employee charged with developing the corporation in California defrauded Richardson, the
corporation was held to be a "controlling person" under the 1934 Act and was liable to the
buyer for any fraud perpetrated by the employee); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968). See also SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515
F.2d 801 (2d Cir. 1975); Moerman v. Zipco, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 439 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd,
422 F.2d 871 (2d Cir. 1970). Cf. Strong v. France, 474 F.2d 747 (9th Cir. 1973); Marshall,
Control Person Liability, 13 REv. SEc. REG. 927 (1980).
When employing Section 20(a), the federal courts must first ascertain whether or
not a defendant is in fact a control person. This determination is an important
aspect of 20(a) litigation. It is submitted that the requirement of actual control
by the person in question, coupled with a rebuttable presumption of control established by the institutional status of the person, is the most accurate determination of control. An individual's institutional status may act as a warning
signal if such a position is normally perceived as one of control. This warning
signal will create a rebuttable presumption of control, requiring the defendant to
show that he did not possess actual control. Actual control is a necessary element
in establishing liability because before a person can exercise control it must be
determined that he had actual control.
Id. at 933; Comment, A Comparison of Control Person Liability and Respondeat Superior:
§ 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 CAL. W.L. REv. 154 (1979). See also Ruder,
Multiple Defendants in Securities Laws FraudCases: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy,In Pari
Deliclo, Indemnification, and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 597, 605 (1972) (emphasis
added):
Unless the agency relationship exists, agency theory cannot be utilized. As a result,
plaintiffs will often find it difficult to use agency theory. If the many possible
secondary defendants, such as banks, accountants, lawyers and others, have neither agreed to act for the primary wrongdoer nor agreed that he may act for
them, the search for a so-called "deep-pocket defendant" in the securities law
field will turn to other theories.
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Actual control (direct or indirect under the 1934 Act) requires more than
a showing of mere status, more than just the authority to control. Actual
control must have been exercised and have been directly related to the transaction in question. 4°
Control person liability cannot be judged in a vacuum. Its existence is
predicated upon a finding of primary liability for securities violations. Although a lender may not have conducted its affairs in a manner justifying
the lender's qualification as a seller, section 15 may create responsibility
where the lender did or could have controlled the party primarily liable under
section 12(2). Such determination is a fact question and almost any conceivable relationship serving as a conduit for control may suffice. The defense in the statute of lack of knowledge or reasonable ground to believe
precludes strict liability. Unlike the common law theory of respondeat superior, section 15 seemingly denies strict liability based on status control
alone. 41 The quality and quantity of knowledge that would infect the lender
to the degree that the lender's reliance on the defense would be unavailable
is a subject discussed extensively infra.
Section 20 of the 1934 Act provides a good faith defense against control
person liability that is broader than the section 15 defense, appropriately
counterbalancing the more inclusive scope of the statute itself. Demonstration of good faith42 and proof that the defendant did not directly or indirectly
induce the violation will cut off liability.
Limitation by the Supreme Court in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder43 of
primary liability under section 10(b) and rule lob-5 to knowing or intentional
misconduct (scienter, used herein, means intent to deceive, manipulate, or
defraud), suggests a similar restriction of the scope of secondary liability
under section 20(a) of the 1934 Act.4"

40. Marshall, supra note 39, quoting from Stern v. American Bankshares Corp., FED. SEC.
96,033 (E.D. Wis. 1977). In Christoffel v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 588 F.2d 665,
668 (9th Cir. 1978), the court stated: "Although the concept of 'control' used in section 20(a)
is broad, it is not unlimited. The term was not used by Congress as it is defined within the
REo. (CCH)

context of common law agency."
41. Lake v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., [1978 Transfer Binder]

FED.

SEC. L. REP. (CCH)

96,509 (N.D. Ind. 1978) (a brokerage firm was not liable as a controlling person for the
acts of its employee in arranging a private transaction with a customer), citing Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder. 425 U.S. 185 (1976):

A significant aspect of "control person liability" is that it is clearly not the
absolute liability of common law respondeat superior. . . . As with the scienter
requirement itself, the implied causes of action should not saddle absolute vicarious liability upon those lacking scienter and who were not related to the

transaction simply under the "control person" rubric, to do so improperly connects the imputed liability concept of control persons with the clearly uncontrolled

wrongful actor whose conduct may merit implied liabilities. ...
Lake v. Kidder, supra at 93,977. See also Clark v. Cameron-Brown Co., [1980 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)

97,539 (N.D.N.C. 1980).

42. For a discussion of the term "good faith," see Comment, supra note 39, at 163.
43. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
44. Id. at 193.
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Complaints asserting that lenders were controlling persons and thus liable for the primary securities violations of their borrowers have survived
motions to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action. The court in In
re Falstaff Brewing Corp. Antitrust Litigation45 recognized the sufficiency
of the cause of action under section 10(b) where lenders had become involved
in the day-to-day operations of their customer in order to monitor the customer's financial condition and prevent default on loans outstanding with
the bank. Although the control exerted in that case was blatant, the case
remains significant for its precedential value. For example, a lender may
not agree to extend credit unless it can retain a degree of control over the
funds advanced to the borrower. Similarly, a lender may include restrictive
covenants and special provisions in the loan document regarding both the
use of the funds extended and the protection of the collateral supporting
the loan. Both examples demonstrate types of control a lender may impose
upon its borrower.46
III.

Antifraud Provisions

Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933

Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act imposes primary liability upon persons in
the offer or sale of securities who, directly or indirectly, defraud or mislead
buyers by making untrue statements or omitting material facts, or who engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business that operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser. 47 Although the prohibitions of section 17 are strong, the statute does not specifically provide

45. 441 F. Supp. 62, 65 (E.D. Mo. 1977). Allegations included that defendants required
Falstaff to: (1) replace acting officers and directors; (2) implement certain policies; (3) revise
its debt structure; (4) obtain an equity investor; (5) give additional security; and (6) obtain
approval before acquiring or selling capital assets.
46. Bartlett, supra note 38, at 652. The authors also delve into the implications of Connor
v. Great Western Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 69 Cal. 2d 850, 447 P.2d 609, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1968),
which is outside the scope of this commentary. See also Greenberg, The Liability of Banks
for Aiding and Abetting Violations of the Securities Laws, 4 ALI-ABA REsouRcE MATERIALS,
BANKING AND COiMmRCIAL LENDnIG LAW (1983) discussed infra at notes 149-151. For additional
case law regarding the scope of controlling persons, see Hamilton Bank & Trust Co. v. Holliday,
469 F. Supp. 1229 (N.D. Ga. 1979); Ingenito v. Bermec Corp., 441 F. Supp. 525 (S.D.N.Y.
1977); Stem v. American Bankshares Corp., 429 F. Supp. 818 (E.D. Wis. 1977); Metzger v.
American Food Mgt., Inc., 389 F. Supp. 469 (W.D. Pa. 1975); Smith v. Manausa, 385 F.
Supp. 443 (E.D. Ky. 1974), modified, 535 F.2d 353 (6th Cir. 1976); Holloway v. Howerdd,
377 F. Supp 754 (M.D. Tenn. 1973), aff'd, 536 F.2d 698 (6th Cir. 1976); Dyer v. Eastern
Trust & Banking Co., 336 F. Supp. 890 (D. Me. 1971); Moerman v. Zipco, Inc., 302 F. Supp.
439 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd, 422 F.2d 871 (2d Cir. 1970). For cases involving allegations against
a lender as a control person, see Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1975);
Richardson v. MacArthur, 451 F.2d 35 (10th Cir. 1971); Fuls v. Shastina Prop., Inc., 448 F.
Supp. 983 (N.D. Cal. 1978); In re Falstaff Brewing Corp. Antitrust Litig., 441 F. Supp. 62
(E.D. Mo. 1977); Ferland v. Orange Groves, Inc., 377 F. Supp. 690 (M.D. Fla. 1974). See
generally Douglas-Hamilton, CreditorLiabilitiesResultingfrom ImproperInterference with the
Management of a Financially Troubled Debtor, 31 Bus. LAw. 343 (1975).
47. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1982).
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for a private right of action. Doubt has been voiced as to whether an implied
civil right of action exists under section 17(a). 41 Four circuits, the Second, 49
the Fourth 50 the Seventh, 5' and the Ninth,5 2 have implied a private right of
action under section 17(a). The Fifth 3 and the Eighth 4 circuits have rejected
the notion. The United States District Court for the Western District of
Oklahoma recently stated that the Tenth Circuit would probably allow a

55
private civil cause of action under section 17(a).
The majority of all claims against lending institutions, however, have been
brought under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 because it is established that a

5
private right of action exists thereunder.

6

Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
SEC Rule 10b-5

Nearly word for word the same as their predecessor, section 17(a), section
10(b) 5 7 and rule lOb-558 have been termed the catch-all provisions of the

48. Mendelsohn v. Capital Underwriters, Inc., 490 F. Supp. 1069, 1080 (N.D. Cal. 1979):
It is one thing to imply a private right of action under § 10(b) or other provisions
of the 1934 Act ....
But it is quite another thing to add an implied remedy
under § 17(a) of the 1933 Act to detailed remedies specifically created by §§ 11
and 12. The 1933 Act is a much narrower statute. It deals only with disclosure
and fraud in the sale of securities....
3 Loss, Securities Regulation, 1758 (2d
ed. 1961)
(Emphasis added.) See also Shell v. Dain, Kalman & Quail, Inc., 561 F.2d 152, 155 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1977); Scarfarotti v. Bache & Co., 438 F. Supp. 199, 207 (S.D.N.Y.
1977); Gunter v. Hutcheson, 433 F. Supp. 42 (N.D. Ga. 1977); Ferland v. Orange Groves of
Florida, Inc., 377 F. Supp., 690, 706 (M.D. Fla. 1974); Dyer v. Eastern Trust & Banking
Corp., 336 F. Supp. 890, 903 (D. Me. 1971).
49. Kirshner v. United States, 603 F.2d 234, 241 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 995
(1980).
50. Newman v. Prior, 518 F.2d 97, 99 (4th Cir. 1975).
51. Daniel v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 F.2d 1223, 1244-45 (7th Cir. 1977), rev'd
on other grounds, 439 U.S. 551 (1979).
52. Stephenson v. Caipine Conifers II, Ltd., 652 F.2d 808, 815 (9th Cir. 1981) ("In light
of the minimal differences between § 17(a) of the 1933 Act and § 10(b) of the 1934 Act, we
think the reasoning of the Second Circuit is persuasive and find that a private right of action
exists under § 17(a)."); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, Inc., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1005, reh'g denied, 404 U.S. 1064 (1972).
53. Landry v. All-American Assur. Co., 688 F.2d 381, 391 (5th Cir. 1982).
54. Shull v. Dain, Kealman & Quail, Inc., 561 F.2d 152, 155 (8th Cir. 1977). See also In
re New York City Mun. Sec. Litig., 507 F. Supp. 169, 187 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Erikssan v. Galvin,
484 F. Supp. 1108, 1127 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Marbury Mgt., Inc. v. Kohn, 470 F. Supp. 509,
514 n.9 (S.D.N.Y.), modified on other grounds., 629 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1011 (1980). Contra, Anschutz Corp. v. Kay Corp., 507 F. Supp. 72, 75 (S.D.N.Y.
1981).
55. Geller v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] FED. Sac. L. Rap.
(CCH), 91,542 (W.D. Okla. 1983).
56. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 569 (1979); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
57. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982) (section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
58. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1984).
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1934 Act.5 9 Section 10(b) is directed toward prevention of the employment
of manipulative and deceptive practices in the purchase or sale of any security. Despite controlling authority that a private right of action is available
under 10(b), its use as a basis for secondary liability interpreted through
common law doctrines has been called into question by at least one legal
scholar. °
Daniel R. Fischel advocates that secondary liability by aiding and abetting,
conspiracy, and respondeat superior common law doctrines are without section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 as drafted and intended by Congress. He theorizes
that secondary liability under section 10(b) is no longer viable in light of
recent Supreme Court decisions strictly interpreting the federal securities
laws. 61 Acceptance of Fischel's theory by the Supreme Court and lower federal courts would be favorably received by lending institutions presently facing the uncertainties of secondary section 10(b) liability. Nevertheless, all
circuit courts of appeal that have faced the issue have found that a defendant
can be held liable for aiding and abetting another defendant who violates
section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. 62 It is therefore unlikely that such cause of
action will be eliminated in the near future.
IV.

Common Law Theories

Aiding and Abetting
Several allegations tend to be predominant in complaints against lenders
for secondary liability under section 10(b). Typically, most complaints are
prefaced with the allegation that the defendant lender aided and abetted the
stated violations. Three elements of common law aiding and abetting liability
are generally required: (1) The existence of a securities law violation by the
primary violator; (2) knowledge of the primary violation on the part of the
aider and abettor; and (3) "substantial assistance" by the aider and abettor
in the primary violation. 63
The degree of knowledge necessary and the acts constituting substantial
59. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 202 (1976).
60. Fischel, Secondary Liability Under Section 10(b) of the SecuritiesAct of 1934, 69 CAti.
L. REv. 80 (1981).
61. The proper inquiry, and, indeed, the only relevant inquiry, is whether Congress
intended to prohibit the challenged conduct in question. When congressional in-

tent, as determined by the language, structure and legislative history of a statute
is used as the touchstone of liability, the proper range of defendants subject to
liability under section 10(b) and rule lob-5 contracts dramatically. Thus, various
classes of defendants who have previously been held to be secondarily liable, such
as lawyers or accountants who fail to "blow the whistle," employers who do no
more than employ wrongdoers, and banks which knowingly finance a wrongdoer,
should no longer be held liable since they have not engaged in any conduct prohibited by the statute.
Id. at 111 (emphasis added).

62. Id. at 81.
63. Stokes v. Lokken, 644 F.2d 779 (8th Cir. 1981); IIT, An Int'l Inv. Trust v. Cornfeld,
619 F.2d 909, 922 (2d Cir. 1980); Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1975). See
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assistance have become the focus of judicial interpretation. Two knowledge
acstandards have developed: (1) "generally aware of his role in improper
6
tivity," 64 and (2) "actual knowledge of the fraudulent scheme."
Examinations of the facts concerning the securities violation and the quantity and quality of contact between the primary and secondary defendants
are frequently blended by courts to substantiate a common-sense determination that the secondary defendant must have known of the illegal conduct.
Common sense "must have known" is then translated by the courts into
a more comfortable "actually knew" holding. This tendency to elevate the
knowledge requirement is justified only because courts are naturally hesitant
to punish a defendant for an act or failure to act when he did not or should
not have known that the proscribed activities were conducted by the primary
defendant.
Knowledge under common law aiding and abetting analysis is substantially66
related to the intent requirement demanded in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder.
Intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud logically implies knowledge by the
secondary defendant of the illegality of the conduct. "Manipulative or deceptive," used in conjunction with "device or contrivance," suggests that
section 10(b) is intended to proscribe knowing or intentional misconduct.
However, because the United States Supreme Court left open the question
of whether, in some instances, reckless behavior is sufficient for civil liability
under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5,6 7 case law from diverse factual situations
is still important to qualify the knowledge necessary to find secondary liability.
Ruder, in his pre-Hochfelder comments,68 argued that impositions of a
duty to investigate, i.e., acquire knowledge, under the guise of a "should
also Greenberg, supra note 46, at 51 n.3; Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259
F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. (1966).
64. SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1316 (6th Cir. 1974), cerl. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975);
Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761, 779 (3d Cir. 1976); Woodward v. Metro
Bank, 522 F.2d 84, 97 (5th Cir. 1975); SEC v. National Bankers Life Ins. Co., 324 F. Supp.
189, 195 (N.D. Tex. 1971), aff'd per curiam, 448 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1971).
65. Saltzman v. Zern, 407 F. Supp. 49 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
66. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
67. Id.at 193 n.13.
68. Ruder, supra note 39, at 632-33:
[D]ifferent considerations enter into eliminating scienter as an element of aiding
and abetting or conspiracy and substituting a duty of inquiry or a "should have
known" standard. In most cases, the alleged aider and abettor (or conspirator)
will merely be engaging in customary business activities, such as loaning money,
managing a corporation, preparing financial statements, distributing press releases,
completing brokerage transactions, or giving legal advice. If each of these parties
will be required to investigate the ultimate activities of a party whom he is assisting, a burden may be imposed on business that is too great.
The essential point is that imposition of a duty to investigate under the guise
of a "should have known" standard in essence would amount to eliminating
scienter as a necessary element in imposing aiding and abetting liability and the
substitution of a negligence standard. [Emphasis added.]
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have known" standard would amount to eliminating scienter as a requisite
element of aiding and abetting liability. Actual knowledge of the fraud or
recklessness in failing to discover the fraud, however, has been held sufficient
to satisfy the second common law element of aiding and abetting in postHochfelder cases.69 "Knowledge may be shown by circumstantial evidence,
or by reckless conduct, but the proof must demonstrate actual awareness
of the party's role in"
the fraudulent scheme." '70 Actual awareness of the
illegal conduct of the primary party will indisputably suffice where the common law elements of aiding and abetting serve as the analytical basis for
section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 liability.
The recent decision of Dirks v. Securities & Exchange Commission,71
concerning a tippee's duty to disclose material nonpublic information received from an insider who breached his fiduciary relation to the shareholders of a corporation, may reflect the United States Supreme Court's
opinion regarding the degree of knowledge necessary to satisfy the language
of section 10(b). In Dirks, the court held that a tippee assumes a fiduciary
duty to the shareholders of a corporation not to trade on material nonpublic
information only when an insider has breached his fiduciary duty to the
shareholders by disclosing information to the tippee and the tippee knows
or should have known that there has been a breach.7 2 The court reemphasized
its decision in Chiarella v. United States,73 which held that a section 10(b)
duty to disclose is predicated upon the finding of a fiduciary relationship.7 4
The court found that Dirks had no fiduciary duty because his tipper had
no such duty. Thus the issue of whether Dirk's knowledge of the source of
the information was sufficient for section 10(b) purposes was never discussed.
Whether a lender's relationship with a borrower must be comparable to
69. Tucker v. Janota, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. Rm. (CCH) 96,701 (N.D.
II1. 1978); Stern v. American Bankshares Corp., 429 F. Supp. 818 (E.D. Wis. 1977). Judge
Warren, after a review of the controlling concepts of Hochfelder, stated that the plaintiff must
allege and prove:
(1) That the person charged as an aider and abettor had knowledge of the fraud
or acted so recklessly that knowledge of the fraud may be imputed to him and,
(2) either (a) having actively participated in the transaction in an effort to assist
the violator in the completion of the transaction, or (b) have failed to disclose
the fraud to the plaintiff in breach of a duty to disclose owing to the plaintiff.
Tucker, supra, at 93,974 (emphasis added), citing from Stern, 429 F. Supp. at 826. See also
Zatkin v. Primuth, [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,832 (S.D. Cal. 1982)
(an accounting firm may be held liable for secondary liability under rule lOb-5 if it knows,
or is reckless in not knowing, that its client has committed a primary violation and it substantially aids the client in the overall enterprise); SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301 (9th
Cir. 1982); Nelson v. Serwold, 576 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970 (1978).
70. Saltzman v. Zern, 407 F. Supp. 49, 55 (E.D. Pa. 1976), citing A. BROMBERG, SEcutrrias
LAw FRAuD § 8.5, at 582 (1974).
71. 681 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
72. 463 U.S. at 654.
73. 445 U.S. 222 (1980). Chiarellais discussed infra at notes 158-164 and accompanying
text.
74. Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
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an insider's fiduciary duty to a corporation before the "knew or should
have known" standard alluded to in Dirks would apply remains an open
question. Related thereto, and discussed infra in part VII, is the issue of
whether a lender must disclose to securities purchasers information gained
about the borrower. Further, to satisfy a "should have known" standard
for section 10(b), must a lender make a detailed inquiry into the activities
of its borrower? Despite Dirks, a reasonable interpretation of Hochfelder
demands that no responsibility for the actions of the primary violator attach
7
absent actual knowledge on the part of the aider and abettor. 1
Substantial assistance by the alleged aider and abettor in accomplishing
the illegal ends of the primary violator is the final element considered by
courts that analyze section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 secondary liability on an
aiding and abetting theory. "Substantial assistance" suggests action or inaction and, like knowledge, is not fairly subject to an exclusive definition.
Accordingly, case law interpretation provides the only insight into this concept.
Part V of this commentary gives examples of conduct that either has or
has not constituted substantial assistance. Because both knowledge and substantial assistance must be directly related to acts or omissions prohibited
under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5, considerable attention is directed to those
issues. In particular, analysis of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 prohibitions
will be directed to actual and potential instances of primary and secondary
liability of lending institutions.
Respondeat Superior
Respondeat superior has been asserted as a basis for secondary liability
under the federal securities laws. The circuit courts do not agree whether
this theory should be available. The Second, 76 the Fifth, 77 the Sixth 78 and
the Seventh79 circuits have taken the position that a violator of federal se-

75. See Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1975).
If the alleged aider and abettor conducts what appears to be a transaction in the
ordinary course of his business, more evidence of his complicity is essential....
If the securities involved are shares of common stock and someone aids and abetts
a fraud in their sale, the culprit would be hard pressed to argue innocence once
his awareness of the general sales activity was shown. On the other hand, if the
document is barely a security at all, like a loan, then other independent commercial
assumptions come into play, and the alleged alder and abettor may be unaware
of any improper activity. Still, even for facially ordinary commercial transactions,
a court may be influenced by a special duty imposed by the securities acts on
the particular type of a party, such as an insider, a controlling person, an accountant or a broker.
Id. at 95-96 (emphasis added).
76. Marbury Mgt., Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1980).
77. Paul F. Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d 1111 (5th Cir. 1980), reha.
denied, 634 F.2d 1355 (5th Cir. i980).
78. Holloway v. Howerdd, 536 F.2d 690 (6th Cir. 1976); Armstrong, Jones & Co. v. SEC,
421 F.2d 359 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 958 (1970).
79. Henricksen v. Henricksen, 640 F.2d 880 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1097 (1981);
Fey v. Walston & Co., 493 F.2d 1036 (7th Cir. 1974).
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curities laws may be liable under controlling person provisions, 0 a respon3
82
deat superior theory, or both. The Third,8 ' the Eighth, and the Ninth
circuits have held that controlling person liability is the exclusive standard
for determining vicarious liability for federal securities law violatiors. The

84
Fourth and the Tenth circuits have not expressly ruled one way or the other.

The Western District of Oklahoma, however, has stated that respondeat
superior is available as a means of imposing secondary liability for a securities law violation in a churning action.8 5 The Supreme Court has not
specifically addressed the question of whether respondeat superior is an avail86
able means to establish violations of federal securities laws.
V.

Securities Acts Liability for Lending Institutions

Conduct actionable under the securities laws for which lending institutions
have been held liable has assumed many forms.8 7 However, restricting discussion to cases where lenders have been attacked as parties to securities

violations by virtue of their lender-borrower relationships with the primary
violators, the case law is incomplete as to exactly what conduct will render

a lender responsible under the securities laws. Not surprising, the cases tend
to depend heavily upon their facts. The degree to which the lender was

involved with its borrower has been the determinative factor in the assessment of either controlling person or secondary aiding and abetting liability.

The flavor of these cases is revealed by an examination of their facts.
A much cited case is Monsen v. Consolidated Dressed Beef Co.88 The
Third Circuit faced "the perplexing dilemma of ascertaining when the legitimate business relationship between a lender and its borrower leaves the
realm of propriety and enters the domain of proscribed conduct. 8 9
80. 15 U.S.C. § 77(o)(1982); 15 U.S.C. § 78T(a) (1982).

81. Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1975); Thomas v. Duralite Co.,
Inc., 524 F.2d 577 (3d Cir. 1975).
82. Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968).
83. Zweig v. Hearst, 521 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975); Douglass
v. Glen Hinton Inv., Inc., 440 F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 1971); Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283
F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal, 1968), modified on other grounds, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970).
84. In Johns Hopkins University v. Hutton, 422 F.2d 1124, 1130 (4th Cir. 1970), the court
found that a broker-dealer's liability for churning could arise from agency principals. In Haynes
v. Anderson & Strudwick, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 1303 (E.D. Va. 1981), the court analyzed the
Fourth Circuit's prior decisions that in some manner related to the theory of respondeat superior
and determined that respondeat superior should not be a theory for recovery for securities law
violations. In Richardson v. MacArthur, 451 F.2d 35, 41 (10th Cir. 1971), the court imposed
"controlling person" liability and stated that section 20(a) is not restricted by agency principals.
85. Liskey v. Oppenheimer & Co., [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
98,419 (W.D. Okla. 1982). See also Frankel v. Wyllie & Thornhill, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 730
(W.D. Va. 1982).
86. But see Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
87. See, e.g., Carroll v. First Nat'l Bank, 413 F.2d 353 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 1003 (1970); Frankel v. Wyllie & Thornhill, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 730 ('.D.Va. 1982);
Woods v. Homes & Structures, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 1270 (D. Kan. 1980); Marrero v. Banco di
Roma (Chicago), 487 F. Supp. 568 (E.D. La. 1980).
88. 579 F.2d 793 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 930 (1978).
89. 579 F.2d at 795.
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Consolidated and its lender bank were sued in a class action instituted
on behalf of the holders of unregistered securities. The securities were promissory notes issued by Consolidated in connection with its voluntary employee payroll deduction plan. Information, payment for the notes, and the
notes were circulated in interstate commerce or through the mails. The notes
were not registered as required by the federal securities laws. The note prograin was highly successful for a number of years and Consolidated never
missed payments to its employees despite the fact that it had accumulated
several thousand dollars of debt on the obligations issued under the program.
To compete in the industry, Consolidated turned to the defendant bank
to obtain additional financing. The bank requested and received extensive
information concerning the note programs and agreed to extend a loan to
Consolidated. The terms of the loan agreement included subordination of
Consolidated's obligations to its employees under the program and restrictions that Consolidated was not to borrow from other sources. The bank
encouraged Consolidated to continue its note program and was aware that
Consolidated never informed the note holders that their investments had
been subordinated to the bank's security interest.
After the loan was finalized, the bank received monthly profit-and-loss
statements and quarterly financial reports, and it knew Consolidated's financial condition was steadily deteriorating, yet it failed to have the note
programs curbed. When Consolidated began failing financially, the bank
seized control and prevented Consolidated from paying interest on the notes
or honoring the notes at maturity.
The case was submitted to the jury on written interrogatories. The jury
found Consolidated liable under section 12(2) of the 1933 Act and section
10(b) of the 1934 Act. Consolidated's misleading statements and omissions
in connection with the note program also made the bank liable as an aider
and abettor, but the bank was exonerated of any liability under section 10(b)
of the 1934 Act.
The bank was granted a motion for judgment n.o.v. on the securities
counts because the district court determined that the evidence was insufficient to prove an intent by the bank to assist a primary violation of the
securities law. 90 The circuit court disagreed, reinstated the jury verdict against
the bank, and cited as critical the fact that the bank knew Consolidated
would not reveal the bank's secured position to the note holders, yet encouraged the continuance of the note program. The court held that the bank
had substantially assisted in Consolidated's violations. 9'
The bank had extensive actual knowledge of Consolidated's note program
and encouraged its continuance. The obligations of Consolidated to its employees, evidenced by the promissory notes, had been subordinated to the
bank as secured creditor. This secret was guarded by both Consolidated and
the bank. Because the note program generated security collateral for the
90. Id. at 802-03.
91. Id. at 803.
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loan, the bank obtained substantial information concerning the program's
administration. From an economic standpoint, even if the bank knew that
the notes had not been properly registered, that fact would not jeopardize
the bank's position. The knowledge the bank did possess, however, exposed
the bank to liability.
The question raised by Monsen is, absent extensive knowledge of the securities transaction concerned and substantial involvement with the business
of the borrower, would the bank have been held liable merely by virtue of
the fact that the bank extended a loan secured by those notes? The court
in Monsen implied that had the justices been the triers of fact, they might
92
not have held the bank liable.
An interesting contrast to Monsen is Woodward v. Metro Bank.9 Although Monsen was primarily argued on a common law aiding-and-abetting
theory, whereas the plaintiff's cause of action in Woodward rested on section
10(b) and rule lOb-5, a contrasting of the two cases is particularly interesting
because the court in Woodward chose to base its analysis of the 10(b) statutory claims in terms of a common law aiding-and-abetting theory. 94 In
addition, the court in Monsen was particularly careful to distinguish the
95
facts in Monsen from those in Woodward.
Woodward concerned a scheme whereby the plaintiff was induced to make
a loan, evidenced by a cross-collateral note to the president of a failing
corporation. The 90-day note was secured by plaintiff's stock and a certificate of deposit. In return, the plaintiff was to receive a monthly stipend
for "counseling" services for the life of the note. In the same time period,
defendant bank had both the corporate account and the president's personal
account. The bank had repeatedly experienced difficulty with the corporate
account, which was plagued with a large number of insufficient fund checks.
The bank had requested that the corporate accounts be changed to another
bank, but it had no indication that the president's account was unstable.
Both accounts were managed by the same bank officer and the plaintiff's
note was signed in that officer's conference room. The same day that the
plaintiff extended her loan to the corporate president, the president transferred funds to the corporate account and a large sum of insufficient funds
checks were thereby paid by the defendant bank. The plaintiff was paid her
counseling fee for four months, but ultimately one of the corporate checks
was returned for lack of funds. When the 90-day note became due for renewal, the bank asked the plaintiff to provide additional collateral, which
she did with checks from the corporate president payable to the bank. Three

92. Id. "It may be that had we been the triers of fact in this case we might not have held
the Bank liable on this record, but the evidence does provide adequate support for jury's verdict
and under our limited role on appeal we cannot unsurp their function."
93. 522 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1975).
94. The line of analysis in Woodward illustrates the overlap and confusion between the
statutory and common law causes of action.
95. Monsen v. Consolidated Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793, 803 n.18 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 930 (1978).
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months later, the corporation filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition and
the bank turned to the plaintiff for collection on the note. Plaintiff sued
the bank under section 10(b) for failure to disclose the borrower's hopeless
financial condition.
Noting the undefined scope of rule lOb-5 and its potential for creative
use in thwarting securities frauds, the court proceeded to define the limits
of that rule. 96 After setting forth the elements required to be proved in rule
lOb-5 actions 97 and giving depth to their meaning," the court then discussed
aiding-and-abetting liability to determine whether Metro Bank's acts and
omissions were sufficient for liability under rule lOb-5.
As the court in Monsen noted, the determinative factor in rule lOb-5 cases
is the degree of knowledge of the alleged securities fraud the defendant

possessed. Translating "knowing" into "scienter," the court in Woodward
stated that the relationship between the bank's activity (i.e., participation
in the fraud) varied inversely with the degree of scienter required to attach
secondary liability to the defendant. "A remote party must not only be aware
of his role, but he should also know when and to what degree he is furthering
the fraud." 99 Using the term, "daily grist of the mill,"I' c° the court concluded
that the bank was not liable under the securities laws and affirmed the trial
court's order dismissing the action as to the bank and the account officer.' 0
96. The court cited the language in Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 804-05 (5th Cir.
1970):
In the formulation of relief, however, concepts of fairness to those who are expected to govern their conduct under Rule lOb-5 should be considered. Protection
for investors is of primary importance, but it must be kept in mind that the
nation's welfare depends upon the maintenance of a viable, vigorous business
community. Consolidated alone, the sweeping language of Rule lOb-5 creates an
almost completely undefined liability. All that the rule requires for its violation
is that someone "do something bad," Jennings & Marsh, Securities Regulation
961 (2d ed. 1968), in connection with a purchase or sale of securities. Without
further delineation, civil liability is formless, and the area of proscribedactivity
could become so great that the beneficial aspects of the rule would not warrant
the proscription. See Ruder, Pitfalls in the Development of a Federal Law of
Corporations by Implication Through Rule lOb-5, 59 Nw. U.L. Rev. 195, 207208 (1964). In recognition of this problem, courts have sought to construct workable limits to liability undersection 10(b) and Rule l0b-5 which will accommodate
the interests of investors, the business community, and the public generally. [Emphasis added.]
97. The court cited Sargent v. Genesco, 492 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1974), for the elements that
must be proved to establish a lob-5 claim: (1) conduct by the defendants proscribed by the
rule; (2) a purchase or sale of securities by the plaintiffs "in connection with" such proscribed
conduct; and (3) resultant damages to the plaintiff.
98. Woodward, 522 F.2d at 93.
99. Id.at 95.
100. Id. at 97. "If the evidence shows no more than transactions constituting the daily grist
of the mill, we would be loathe to find lob-5 liability without clear proof of intent to violate
the securities laws." Note that this statement may be construed to mean that the lender must
know that his borrower's conduct violates the securities laws.
101. Id. at 100. The court in Woodward prefaced its judgment by stating:
While we are confident that our solution here is correct, we have written at length
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The Woodward opinion was welcomed by lender counsel and is frequently
cited. However, two issues that the court in Woodward confidently dismissed
have become major lines of attack for plaintiffs: (1) whether the bank had
a duty to disclose the corporation's past financial problems and the existence
of other loans by the bank to the corporation and its president, and (2)
whether the bank's silence
regarding the cross-collateral clauses' 2 was "sub03
stantial assistance.'

The critical difference between Monsen and Woodward was the defendant
bank's (in Woodward) lack of knowledge of its borrower's fraud.' 4 However, that distinction is none too comfortable without a uniform definition6°
of what constitutes knowledge.'10 The recent case of Wright v. Schock1
dealt with the issue of culpable knowledge and lender liability. The court's
resolution of this and other issues is persuasive authority
in determining the
0 7
complex questions that arise in lender liability cases.
VI.

Wright v. Schock

The plaintiffs in Wright brought a class action alleging violations of federal and state securities laws and common law fraud in connection with their
purchase of promissory notes. The promissory notes, issued by Golden State
Home Loans (GSHL), were secured by deeds of trust on real property and
were characterized as lucrative but safe investments. Defendants in the action
included two banks and nine title companies.
GSHL was a licensed mortgage loan broker soliciting trust deed investments through advertisements in newspapers, by telephone, by way of investment seminars, and by mail. GSHL serviced the loans and offered other
enticements to investors. 03 The title companies were involved in preparing

to insure that our opinion will not be used to cordon off all bank-associated notes
from the coverage of lOb-5. Under different facts, demonstrating awareness of
complicity and substantial assistance, we would not hesitate to hold a bank to
account.
102. The cross-collateral clause had the effect of extending the plaintiff's liability to the
corporate president's two other outstanding personal loans.
103. Regarding the bank's duty to disclose, the court in Woodward stated: "The other loans
- . were confidential information that Metro had no duty to disclose to [the plaintiff] absent
some new expansion of lob-5." In the previous paragraph the court commented that "the
raison d' etre of accomodation is to find stronger financial support for a proposed bill or
note. We are not prepared effectively to abolish this commercial practice of Rule 10b-5 without
some indication that Congress intended this result." Woodward, 522 F.2d at 99.
104. Monsen v. Consolidated Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 930 (1978).
105. See supra notes 63-75 and accompanying text.
106. 571 F. Supp. 642 (N.D. Cal. 1983), aff'd, 742 F.2d 541 (9th Cir. 1984).
107. But cf. Little v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 650 F.2d 218 (9th Cir. 1981). The district court in
Little instructed the jury that wanton and reckless disregard for facts would suffice to show
actual knowledge. Because the defendants did not attack the jury instructions on appeal, the
circuit court did not rule on the legal question.
108. Under a servicing agreement, terminable on 30 days' notice by the investor, GSHL
collected the borrowers' payments and remitted them to the investors. Promotional literature
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preliminary title reports, issuing lenders' title insurance policies, and oc-

casionally performing partial escrow services. The banks rendered services
such as referring GSHL to prospective investors, maintaining checking accounts for GSHL, arranging for lock boxes, making loans to GSHL and
its president personally, and extending a working line of credit to GSHL.

One bank's name was printed on a loan-servicing agreement form used by
GSHL as part of its promotional materials (although the bank asserted that
use of its name in this manner was without authorization).109 GSHL collapsed
shortly after plaintiffs purchased the notes. The court stated that "[b]oth
banks carried on no more than an ordinary banking relationship with
GSHL. . .. "110
Plaintiffs asserted claims based on section 12(2) seller status, primary liability under sections 17(a), 10(b), and rule lOb-5, aiding and abetting, and
controlling person liability."' Summary judgment was granted to the banks
and title company defendants.
Addressing the issue of whether the banks and title companies could be
brought within the statutory phrase "any person who-offers or sells a security,"" 2 the court wrestled with how expansively section 12(2) should be
4
read. Discussing the strict privity"3 requirement and its continuing viability"1
and the substantial factor tests,"' the court held that the defendant banks
and title insurance companies were not sellers within the meaning of the
statute. The court did not, however, expressly select either the strict privity
or the substantial factor test. The court stated that although the title reports,
availability of title insurance, and escrow services of the title companies,
and the account services, loans, and general references of the banks may
have been but-for causes of GSHL's sales of securities, they were not proximate causes or substantial factors in the sales. 1 6 The opinion emphasized
that other banks could have provided the loans and services and that title
7
insurance was not a major inducement to the plaintiffs' investments."

spoke of a policy of advancing payments to investors if the borrowers paid late, but did not
mention reimbursement. All title work and escrow was to be arranged by GSHL.
109. Id.
110. Wright v. Schock, 571 F. Supp. 642, 655 (N.D. Cal. 1983), aff'd, 742 F.2d 541 (9th
Cir. 1984).
Ill. Id. The court also extensively discussed whether promissory notes secured by deeds of
trust on real property were within the statutory definition of a security. The deeds of trust
were held to be securities.
112. 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1982).
113. Wright v. Schock, 571 F. Supp. 642, 657 (N.D. Cal. 1983), aff'd, 742 F.2d 541 (9th
Cir. 1984). The district court noted: "This view has been espoused by the Third and Seventh
Circuits. Collins v. Signetics Corp., 605 F.2d 110, 113 (3d Cir. 1979). Accord, Sanders v. John
Nuveen & Co., Inc., 619 F. 2d 1222, 1276 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1005 (1981)."
114. Wright v. Schock, 571 F. Supp. 642 (N.D. Cal. 1983), aff'd, 742 F.2d 541 (9th Cir.
1984), citing Admiralty Fund v. Jones, 677 F.2d 1289, 1294 n.3 (9th Cir. 1982).
115. Wright, 571 F. Supp. at 657, aff'd 742 F.2d 541 (9th Cir. 1984), citing Hill York Corp.
v. International Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680, 692 (5th Cir. 1971).
116. Wright v. Schock, 571 F. Supp. at 657, aff'd, 742 F.2d 541 (9th Cir. 1984).
117. Id. "These defendants performed routine services in the ordinary course of business.
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The justices did not linger over the plaintiffs' allegation that the defendants were secondarily liable for GSHL's alleged section 12(2) violation. The
court expressed doubt as to whether aiding-and-abetting liability exists with
respect to section 12(2) violations. In resolving this matter, the court found
that secondary liability could extend no farther than the substantial factor
test.
Plaintiffs argued that failure to disclose material information concerning
GSHL's business and the risks of its trust and investments were grounds
for primary violations under the antifraud provisions of section 17(a), section
10(b), and rule lOb-5. The analytical framework provided by White v.
Abrams"' formed the basis for the court's decision. The court reasoned that
even if the defendants possessed material information not available to the
plaintiffs, the defendants were under no duty to disclose it.
Under White, whether a defendant is obligated to disclose material information to the plaintiff depends on the aggregate of several factors. One
factor identified in White is the defendant's access to information as compared to the plaintiff's access." 9 A second factor is whether the defendant
was aware that the plaintiff was depending upon their relationship in making
his investment decision.' 20 The presence of several White factors, however,
does not automatically create section 10(b) liability for failure to disclose
material information.
Particular attention should be given to the court's application of the White
factors to the facts of Wright. The court was sufficiently convinced that the
banks' and title companies' relationship with the investors, although fairly
substantial, was not sufficient to hold either class of defendants primarily
liable for the asserted section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 violations and that sum2
mary judgment was merited.' '
Regarding the issue of whether a private right of action under section
17(a) should be allowed, the court reasoned that the differences between
section 10(b) and section 17(a) are minimal, disregarding the Supreme Court's
For any particular sale of an investment, neither the particular title company nor the particular
bank involved was in any sense a necessary participant, since any other title company or bank
could have provided indentical services."
118. 495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974).
119. Id. at 735-36:
The relationship of the defendant to the plaintiff, the defendant's access to the
information as compared to the plaintiff's access, the benefit that the defendant

derives from the relationship, the defendant's awareness of whether the plaintiff
was relying upon their relationship in making his investment decisions and the
defendant's activity in initiating the securities transaction in question. (Footnotes
omitted.)
The White factors continue to be used in the Ninth Circuit to define the scope of duty of
disclosure a defendant owes a plaintiff in a 10(b) case despite the fact that White contemplated
the possibility of liability under rule lOb-5 for negligence which was abrogated in Hochfelder.
See Wright, [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP'. (CCH) at 96,363 n.9.
120. White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974).
121. Wright v. Schock, 571 F. Supp. 642, 662 (N.D. Cal. 1983), aff'd, 742 F.2d 541 (9th
Cir. 1984).
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dictum that section 17(a) applies only to "sellers."' Both sections require
the same showing of duty to disclose, scienter, and reliance. Therefore, having absolved both classes of defendants of primary section 10(b) liability,
the court reasoned the same result must obtain under the section 17(a) complaint. 2
The Wright court formed its decision around the common law elements
of aiding and abetting' 24 and granted summary judgments to the defendants
on the section 10(b) issue. Distinguishing a primary violator's duty to disclose
from the duty to disclose that pertains to aider-and-abettor liability, the court
cited Harmesen v. Smith.?2 A primary violator's duty to disclose arises from
his involvement with the entity whose securities are at issue and his relationship to the plaintiffs. A secondary violator's duty, however, 26
arises from
knowing assistance of or participation in a fraudulent scheme.
Neither the "knowledge" nor the "substantial assistance" burdens were
carried by the plaintiffs to prevent summary judgment for the defendants.
Specifically, pleading merely that the defendants "must have known" did
not suffice to show actual knowledge, nor did the performance of what the
court described as ministerial tasks amount to substantial assistance. Finally,
the court refused to convert the defendants' silence and inaction into substantial assistance absent evidence that the defendants sought to benefit
themselves from the consummation of GSHL's fraud. 27
The court also found the defendants not liable as controlling persons under
section 15 of the 1933 Act and section 20 of the 1934 Act. "Plaintiffs'
theory-to call it 'novel' would be unduly complimentary-is that the banks
and title companies collectively controlled GSHL because their services were
indispensable." 1
The disposition of Wright on defendants' motion for summary judgment
is significant. Viewing the facts pled in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the Wright court determined that there were no triable issues as to
the defendants' alleged liability. Specifically, these facts were, first, a history
of financial dealings between GSHL and the defendant banks. Several loans
and a line of credit secured by notes and deeds of trust exceeding a half
million dollars had been extended to GSHL or its president. Second, one
defendant bank's name appeared on a loan-servicing agreement and both
banks were listed as references in the promotional materials. Third, the GSHL
accounts were among the five largest loans of one defendant bank. Finally,
122. 571 F. Supp. at 662.
123. Id.
124. The elements used in Wright are (1) the existence of an independent primary wrong;
(2) actual knowledge by the alleged aider and abettor of the wrong and his role in furthering
it; and (3) substantial assistance in the wrong. Id. at 662-63.
125. 693 F.2d 932, 943 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 89 (1983).
126. Id., citing Monsen v. Consolidated Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793, 799 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 930 (1978); Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84, 97 (5th Cir. 1975).
127. Wright v. Schock, 571 F. Supp. 642, 663 (N.D. Cal. 1983), aff'd, 742 F.2d 541 (9th
Cir. 1984).
128. Id. at 664.
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the nature of GSHL's enterprise had been communicated to officers of the

defendant banks prior to the extension of loans to GSHL by those defendant
banks. Presented with this evidence, the Wright court found that "the re-

lationship between GSHL and the banks was not extraordinary

1 29

and that

"the banks possessed no greater knowledge than that presumably available

to investors."' 30
The Wright court, by choosing to dismiss the action without jury con-

sideration, recognized the importance of preserving the traditional lenderborrower business relationship without subjecting lenders to exposure for

the federal securities violations of their borrowers. By extrapolation and
embellishment, the facts of Wright conform in operational impact with facts
in cases currently pending before federal district courts.' 3 1 Wright should
prove to be influential.

The Wright opinion is pro-lender but should not be considered dispositive
on the issue of lending institution liability for the securities violations of
their customers. The Wright case joins the company of several other pro-

lender adjudications that seem to constitute a trend for current interpretation
of the federal securities laws as those laws affect the traditional lender32

borrower relationship.
Compare, however, the following case presented on motion for summary
judgment by defendant lenders: A standing arrangement existed whereby
prospective investors were regularly referred to one of the defendant lenders
to procure loans for the purpose of purchasing the investments. The lender
was willing to extend unsecured loans and this fact was made a selling point

by the firm in attracting investors. The alleged securities violations were
failure to comply with sections 12(2) and 10(b) and rule 10b-5. The lending
institutions were accused of aiding and abetting these violations.
33
On facts substantially the same as these, the court in Tucker v. Janota

denied motions for summary judgment brought by the defendant banks.

129. Id. at 655.
130. Id. at 661: "[pllaintiffs present[ed] no evidence that the banks possessed anything more
than very general knowledge about GSHL's operation, including the information obtainable
from its financial statements-information presumably available to investors." See also Representative Plaintiffs' "Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Motions for
Summary Judgment," Wright v. Schock, 571 F. Supp. 642 (N.D. Cal. 1983, aff'd, 742 F.2d
541 (9th Cir. 1984).
131. See, e.g., Wurzburg v. Cornelius, First Consolidated and Amended Class Action Complaint, 83 Cir. 0628 (PNL), 83 Civ. 0794 (PNL), 83-0589 (JRx) (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 1983).
132. Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1975); Clark v. Cameron-Brown Co.,
[1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
97,539 (M.D.N.C. 1980); Resource Inv.
v. Natural Res. Inv. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 194 (E.D. Mich. 1978); Fuls v. Shastina Prop., Inc.,
448 F. Supp. 983 (N.D. Cal. 1978); Ferland v. Orange Groves of Florida, Inc., 377 F. Supp.
690 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
133. [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,701, at 94,716 (N.D. Il1. 1978).
Defendants were granted a summary judgment on the issue of whether defendants had violated
the margin requirement of section 7(c) of the 1934 Act. The court held there is no private
right of action for a violation of section 7(c) of the Exchange Act. The requirements for aiding
and abetting outlined by the court were that the alleged aider and abettor substantially aided
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Adopting the position that the scienter element required for section 10(b)
violations as announced by the Supreme Court in Hochfelder3 4 may be satisfied by recklessness, the court believed summary judgment to be inappropriate because triable issues of fact existed as to the scienter possessed by
the defendant banks.
VII.

Analysis

Throughout the introductory part of this commentary and especially in
part VI, two questions recur; the answers determine whether a lender will
be held liable for the securities law violations of its borrower. The first
question addresses the intended scope of the securities laws: Does or should
a lender owe a duty to an investor to protect that investor from the securities
law violations of its borrower? The second question proceeds from the assumption that such a duty does and should exist and asks the question central
to the resolution of all lender liability cases: Did the lender fulfill its duty
to the investor?
As the discussion in part VI illustrates, no court has expressly held that
the securities acts do not impose a duty upon a lender to protect investors
from the securities violations of its borrower. Rather, lender liability cases
have turned upon the second question. However, as courts have attempted
to define the nature of the duty a lender supposedly owes an investor by
ruling whether certain conduct or omissions on the part of a lender violates
the securities acts, the same courts have placed lenders in an economic predicament that contradicts the express policy underlying the federal securities
acts. The impact of that statement is demonstrated by revealing the predicament that lenders currently face as potential exposure to liability for the
securities violations of their borrowers increases, juxtaposed against the policy that the securities acts were intended to "protect the public with the
least possible interference to honest business."' 35
A common financial transaction between a lender and a borrower involves
the extension of a loan to a limited partnership secured by the partnership's
assets and personal notes from the limited partners. For example, suppose
that an oil and gas company raises capital for its speculative ventures by
selling limited partnership interests (securities). The buyers' investment decision is influenced, if not induced, by the company's representations of tax
breaks, the company's financial strength based on the appraised present
value of oil and gas reserves held by the company, and the company's history
of success in finding and producing natural resources. The company then
solicits an energy loan from a lending institution.
The lender makes independent evaluations of the financial condition of
the company and determines that the company's reserves are not as extensive
the unlawful scheme and possessed some degree of scienter, citing Woodward v. Metro Bank,
522 F.2d 84, 94-97 (5th Cir. 1975).
134, 425 U.S. 185 (1976),
135. S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933).
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or valuable as the borrower represents. After factoring in risks and profit,
the lender decides to loan the company one half of the amount requested.
The loan document contains language granting security interests in all present
and future reserves and collateral owned by the company, covenants restricting the ability of the company to encumber the assets supporting the
loan, and provisions requiring the company to make periodic financial reports to the lender. Presumably, these provisions render the lender a controlling person for purposes of the securities acts.
After a period of time, the company has exhausted the loan fund and
requires additional operating capital to continue its ventures and to make
interest payments on the loan. With the knowledge of the lender, the company sells more interests in the same limited partnership based on the same
prospectus circulated before. In the second offering, however, the company36
makes fraudulent statements and omits material information to buyers.'
The lender has no knowledge of this fraud.
Market conditions cause a precipitous decline in the price of oil and gas,
which greatly devalues the company's stated reserves. The company is unable
to fulfill its obligations under the loan, and the lender calls the notes and
seizes the collateral, which forces the company to seek bankruptcy.
The disappointed investors discover the company's frauds and seek reimbursement; however, the bankrupt company has no ready assets from which
a judgment against it can be satisfied. The first group of investors discover
the discrepency between the company's estimated reserves as reflected in the
prospectus and the bank's valuation. The second group of investors contend
that the relationship between the lender and the company was so close that
the lender knew or should have known of the company's frauds. Both investor groups join and sue the solvent lender.
Several theories of liability are offered by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs
allege that the lender was a substantial factor inducing the sale of the security
and is therefore primarily liable as a seller under section 12(2).' 3 Additionally, it is asserted that because the lender omitted to disclose material
facts it allegedly knew about the company, the lender is primarily liable
under sections 17(a) and 10(b) and rule lOb-5.' 3 8 Based on the provisions in
the loan document, plaintiffs allege that the lender controlled the company
139
and is therefore jointly and severally liable for the fraud of the company.
Finally, intermixing assertions of aiding and abetting' 40 and section 10(b),
the investors seek to hold the lender secondarily liable because the lender
136. The untrue statements made by the borrower to the investor constitute a basis for
primary liability for the borrower under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5.
137. 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1982) (section 12(2) of the 1933 Act).
138. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1982) (section 17(a) of the 1933 Act), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982)
(section 10(b) of the 1934 Act), and 17 C.F.R. § 240.10-5 (1980), respectively.
139. 15 U.S.C. § 77(o) (1982) (section 15 of the 1933 Act) and 15 U.S.C. § 78(t) (1982)
(section 20 of the 1934 Act).
140. Because the common law theories of aiding and abetting and respondeat superior are
most frequently used by courts only as a framework for construing statutory provisions, further
discussion of these theories is omitted.
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pursued a course of business it knew or should have known, from its relationship with the company, indirectly allowed the company to defraud the
investors. Is the lender liable under this set of facts?
Clearly, in the common use of the word, the lender was not a seller of
the securities. However, if a court were to reject the strict privity approach 4'
142
and determine that the lender was a proximate cause or a substantial factor
inducing the sale, the lender would be forced to establish the defenses provided in section 12(2) to escape liability as a seller. The lender would have
to prove that it did not know and in the exercise of reasonable care could
not have known of the untruths and omissions of the company to the inves43
tors.1
As the facts stipulate, the lender presumably knew that the company had
represented reserve values to investors that were higher than the lender's
independent estimation of the values. Similarly, the lender knew that the
company had sold a second set of interests in the same limited partnership
to enable the company to make interest payments on the loan. The lender
did not know, however, that the company had defrauded the second set of
investors.
Assume for the moment that the lender can prove that it was appropriately
ignorant of the company's misrepresentations and fraud sufficient to establish the section 12(2) defense. The lender must still refute controlling
person primary liability and section 10(b) primary and secondary liability.
44
As will be seen, the imposition of a knew or should have known standard
in section 10(b) cases, with the concomitant obligations to inquire and disclose, would require a lender to acquire more knowledge about its borrower
in order to avoid section 10(b) liability. That additional knowledge would
lessen the likelihood that the section 12(2) ignorance defenses could be supported.
Recall that under both securities acts a person who controls another person
liable under the securities acts faces joint and several liability for the infraction unless, under the 1933 Act, the controlling person had no knowledge
of or reasonable grounds to believe of the existence of the violation, 45 or,
under the 1934 Act, acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly
induce the violation.46 Assuming that the plaintiffs can convince the court
that the lender controlled the company through the loan document, the lender
is again faced with establishing a defense that depends greatly on what the
lender knew or should have known about the securities violation. The availability of the defenses under sections 15 and 20 would be greatly affected
by the amount of knowledge, and the disclosure thereof, the lender had to
acquire to avoid secondary section 10(b) liability.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Silverstein, supra note 3.
Id.
15 U.S.C. § 771 (1982).
Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
15 U.S.C. § 77(o) (1982).
15 U.S.C. § 78T(a) (1982). See also supra note 42.
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The lender must also avoid the catch-all scope of both primary and secondary liability under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. Faced with the decision
of whether the lender engaged in a course of business that operated as a
fraud upon either group of investors because the lender knew that the company overstated the value of its reserves and/or because the lender knew
that a second set of securities were sold, the court must determine whether
the lender's knowledge constituted sufficient scienter 47 to violate section 10(b)
and rule lOb-5. If a court were to adopt the knew-or-should-have-known
standard,' 48 that court would effectively require that lenders diligently scrutinize the securities sales of their borrowers in order to enable the lender to
discharge its supposed duty of disclosure to the investor to avoid secondary
section 10(b) liability.
The predicament the lender faces in order to exculpate itself from the
various theories of liability is that to avoid secondary section 10(b) liability,
it must adequately inquire into the securities sales of its borrowers and disclose to the investors any suspected violations of the securities acts. On the
other hand, the knowledge the lender thereby gains reduces the likelihood
that it could establish the ignorance and good faith defenses to seller and
controlling person primary liability.
Stephen J. Greenberg concluded that to avoid alder-and-abettor liability,
a lending institution that has financing arrangements with public companies
or persons engaged in securities transactions would have to scrutinize all
transactions the lender finances. 49 Greenberg also foresaw the paradox that
"the more the bank learns, the greater the likelihood that it can be held
liable for the conduct of its borrower."' 50 Greenberg's solution is for the
lender quickly to voice any objection it has to the unlawful conduct of its
borrower.' 5' Greenberg apparently realizes that rather than gambling that it
can overcome a knew-or-should-have-known standard in section 10(b) cases,
a lender will elect to inquire into the conduct of its borrower and then
disclose to investors any suspected securities violations.
Greenberg's solution is, however, incomplete and unrealistic for three reasons. First, provided that due inquiry and disclosure are the means by which
a lender can avoid section 10(b) liability, the lender then must decide what
it must and can disclose to investors without violating its obligation of confidentiality to its borrower. Second, applying a broad knew-or-should-haveknown standard to section 10(b) would necessarily affect the lender's ability
to establish the more conservative defenses to seller and controlling person
liability. Third, the economic costs of conducting what would, in effect, be
a due diligence inquiry, added to the increased risk that the lender might
violate its duty of confidentiality to its borrower when the lender fulfills its

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
See supra notes 63-75 and accompanying text.
Greenberg, supra note 46, at 49.
Id.
Id.
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duty of disclosure, would either be included in the costs of loans to such
borrower, or lenders would choose to abstain from making the loans.
If the knew-or-should-have-known standard were applied in section 10(b)
cases, then a lender would be faced with two choices. First, it could accept
an increased probability that a plaintiff could prove that because of the
relationship between the lender and the borrower, the lender should have
known about the securities violations of its borrower. Alternatively, the lender
could police the activities of its borrowers and disclose all suspected or potential infractions. The latter alternative seemingly complements the investor
protection policy of the securities acts; 152 however, it also presupposes that
the lender should have a duty of disclosure. Discussion regarding the desirability of requiring that a lender inquire and disclose immediately follows,
but the decision whether the knowledge, once gained, must be disclosed
differs materially from the requirement that the lender must acquire that
information. The difference also affects the availability of the defenses to
seller and controlling person liability.
Although a lender may decide that it would not be required to disclose
certain types of information, it must also contend with the predicament that
(1) if the lender fails to inquire, it may be held that it should have known;
(2) to reach the disclosure decision it must gain knowledge; and (3) the
lender's increased knowledge reduces the likelihood that the seller and controlling person defenses can be supported.
The same knowledge standard should be used for purposes of the defenses
to seller and controlling person liability as is used for secondary section
10(b) liability. Permitting a lender to escape section 10(b) liability by defining
what can and must be disclosed to investors without rejecting the knew-orshould-have-known standard would not reduce the lender's predicament concerning seller and controlling person liability.
As might be expected, the cases discussing the general issues of duty to
disclose under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 are by no means consistent. At
one extreme is Rosen v. Dick,'53 where a corporation's trustee in reorganization brought an antifraud suit against the board of directors and Dick,
a former officer of the corporation. The suit alleged that Dick and the board
had colluded to induce the corporation to release all claims against the defendant bank. The trustee pled that the release was inoperative.
Dick had fraudulently sold securities to the corporation. It was alleged
that the board of directors knew of Dick's fraud and that the release granted
to the bank was part of a broader illegal agreement between the board,
Dick, and the bank to conceal Dick's defalcations and the directors' knowledge thereof from the corporation's shareholders and the appropriate reg5 4 The bank moved the court to dismiss
ulatory authorities.Y
on the basis that
the bank had no duty to disclose Dick's frauds and that it did not affirm-

152. S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933).
153. [1974-75 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
154. Id. at 96,604.
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atively make any misrepresentations to the corporation concerning the sale. 15
The Rosen court denied the bank's motion to dismiss and stated that, in
order to be held as an aider and abettor of a securities fraud, it was "not
necessary that the bank had any affirmative duty to disclose Dick's
defalcations"' 15 6 to the corporation. "[S]econdary liability under the federal
securities laws may be imposed if a person has actual knowledge of another's
improper scheme plus an intent to further that scheme (i.e., scienter) and
he has given substantial assistance to the primary wrongdoer."' 157
Whether the Rosen court would have made the same statement if a knewor-should-have-known standard had been applied, rather than the actual
knowledge standard used, or, instead, would have determined that the bank
had an affirmative duty to disclose its knowledge to the corporation, is an
open question. The liberality of Rosen is, however, questionable because of
the subsequent decision in Chiarella v. United States."8
In Chiarellathe Supreme Court addressed whether secondary liability under section 10(b) was appropriate where a financial printer, who had discovered the identity of merger target companies, had made profitable stock
trades based on that information. The court mentioned decisions holding
dealers, 5 9 corporate insiders,' 60 and tippees 6' liable for nondisclosure, but
flatly rejected the contention that the printer was under a duty to everyone,
to the market as a whole, to disclose the information.1 62 The Court stated:
Formulation of such a broad duty, which departs radically from
the established doctrine that duty arises from a specific relationship between two parties . . . should not be undertaken absent

some explicit evidence of congressional intent.

63

We hold that a duty to disclose under section 10(b) does not arise
64
from the mere possession of nonpublic information.
In Chiarellathere was no question as to what the printer knew. Rather,
the court refused to create a duty between the printer and the investors that
was not explicitly intended by Congress. Similarly, there is no explicit evidence to indicate that Congress intended a lender to owe a duty of disclosure
to investors. Chiarella was using the information for his own purposes and
financial benefit, just as a lender uses information about its borrower for
the lender's own purposes and financial benefit (i.e., repayment of the loan).
Thus, unless the relationship between a lender and an investor is materially
155. Id.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id.
Id.
445 U.S. 222 (1980).
Id. at 226.
Id. at 229.
Id. at 230 n.12.
Id.at 232.
Id. at 233.

164. Id.at 235.
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different than the relationship between a financial printer and the trading
public, the lender should have no duty to disclose nonpublic information
to the investor.
It may be unlikely that the Supreme Court would flatly state that a lender
owes no duty of disclosure to an investor because of circumstances similar
to those that existed in Monsen.165 Further, even if the Supreme Court narrowly defined the circumstances under which a lender would have to disclose,
unless the court were also to apply a standard stricter than the knew-orshould-have-known standard to seller and controlling person liability, a lender
would still face the predicament described above. An interpretation of the
securities acts consistent with the policy that the acts were designed to "protect investors with the least possible interference with honest business'6
requires that both constructions of section 10(b) be made as suggested.
Responsible business practices require that lenders acquire knowledge about
the activities of their borrowers. In turn, lenders have an obligation to safeguard, such information as confidential. 67 Assuming that, in defined circumstances, a lender does owe a duty of disclosure to an investor, the lender
is also faced with the question of what information must be disclosed as
opposed to what information can be disclosed without violating its duty to
the borrower. Judicial action to protect investors by expanding the catchall net of section 10(b) to include lenders that knew or should have known
of their borrower's primary violation would cause lenders to face an increased risk that information gathered and disclosed to satisfy section 10(b)
might be information the borrower considered confidential. Increased exposure to risk outside the securities acts would accordingly be reflected in
higher loan costs.
Realize, too, that the costs incurred by a lender protecting itself from
section 10(b) liability-inquiry and disclosure-will be passed on to the borrower in the form of higher loan costs.' 6" If a lender is unable to pass on
the costs associated with reducing its exposure to these liabilities, the lender
will be hesitant or unwilling to finance borrowers who engage in securities
transactions. The costs to society are apparent.
Conclusion
Uncertainty as to the nature of the duty that a financial institution supposedly owes to an investor to protect that investor from the securities law
165. 579 F.2d 793 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 930 (1978). Monsen is discussed supra
at notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
166. S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933).
167. Lenders have been held liable for revealing financial records to private parties. See
Milohnich v. First Nat'l Bank, 224 So. 2d 759, 760 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969); Peterson v.
Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 83 Idaho 578, 583, 367 P.2d 284, 290 (1961); Note, The Right to
FinancialPrivac, Act and the SEC, 39 WASH. & LEE L. Rnv. 1073 (1982).
168. To reduce both the risk and cost of a loan, a lender may want to assert varied forms
of control over both the monies loaned and the activity of the borrower. As the amount of
control increases, so does potential liability for being a controling person.
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violations of its borrower provided the source for this commentary. Theoretical certainty would be produced by defining that presumed duty by
constructively imposing a qualified duty of inquiry and disclosure upon lenders. Seemingly, application of a knew-or-should-have-known standard in section 10(b) cases advances the investor protection policy of the securities acts.
However, the resulting effects on the defenses to seller and controlling person
liability, combined with the economic repercussions caused thereby, interfere
with honest business. Thus, imposing a duty of inquiry and disclosure on
lenders actually subverts the basic policy underlying the securities acts. 69
What has been developed as theory in this commentary threatens to become practice in the federal courts. The recent trend of strict interpretation
of the securities acts, which the United States Supreme Court is promoting,
indicates that inferior courts should be cognizant of the purposes Congress
intended to accomplish by enacting the securities acts of 1933 and 1934.
Recognition of Congress' intent demands that lenders do not and should
not owe a duty to investors to protect them from the securities law violations
70

of their borrowers.1

David R. Cordell

169. See supra note 10.
170. The Ninth Circuit seems to be following the example set in Wright v. Schock, [19831984 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,411 (N.D. Cal. 1983). In Montgomery
v. Batt, [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,647 (N.D. Cal. 1983), the
court held that a financial consultant and a bank providing services to an investment company
were not liable as aiders and abettors for nondisclosures even if they were aware of some
improper practices because they were under no duty to disclose and because they did not render
substantial assistance to the wrong. The only duty owed investors was to refrain from reckless
or intentional misrepresentation.
In granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment, the court also found that the
bank, which had maintained commercial checking accounts for the creator of trust deed investments, was not liable under section 12 since it was not an "offeror" or "seller" of a
security and was neither in "privity" with the purchasers nor a "substantial factor" in the
transaction.
Compare Davis v. Avco Fin. Serv., 739 F.2d 1057 (6th Cir. 1984), where a lender and loan
officer were held liable as sellers under section 12(2) because the loan officer participated in
the promotion and sale of the "Dare to Be Great" scam. The lender, Avco, was held liable
on a theory of respondeat superior. Special attention should be given to the considerations
listed by the majority in analyzing whether a seller has established the affirmative defenses
under section 12(2). See also the dissent by Justice Lively, 739 F.2d at 1069.
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